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STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND {D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR UPON 
INTRODUCTION OF BILL TO AUTHORIZE AND ESTABLISH A FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL 
SECURITY PROGRAM,~~JO, 1959• 
Mr. President, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision 
in the case of Greene v. McElroy . et al, delivered on June 29, 
1959, our country is without any effective industrial security 
program. It is imperative that the Congress act immediately to 
overcome the result of this decision1and to protect the internal 
security of the country. 
The Department of Defense has long had an industrial security 
program, as have other government agencies and departments. 
These departments and agencies have specified in their contracts 
with contractors that no classified information was to be revealed, 
and no access to areas where classified projects were conducted 
was to be permitted, to any person not given security clearance 
by the Government department or agency. Pursuant to such con­
tractual provisions, the departments and agencies have granted 
and declined security clearances to employees of their contractors. 
In determining whether clearances should be granted or declined, 
the various agencies and departments of Government have carefully 
avoided damaging the Government's security program/by not revealing 
the identification of the sources of their information. In so 
doing, the person for whom the security clearance was sought/has 
often not been confronted with the witnesses who gave information 
on his case, nor has such person been given access to all the 
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information/which is available to the department or agency which 
determines the matter. 
The Greene Ease was probably a typical example. Greene was 
the executive Vice-President of a contractor of the Department 
of Defense. He was an aeronautical engineer. He had had prior 
clearances for classified work. In 1954 his security clearance 
was revokedo Since his employer was almost exclusively working 
on contracts for the Government, the contractor had no further 
need for his services /and he was discharged. Greene was unable 
to find other employment in his field /and brought an action to 
have the denial of a security clearance declared unlawful. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals decided adversely 
to Greene, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower Courts and 
grantee Greene's petition. 
During the conduct of the proceedings to determine whether 
the security clearance should or should not be grapted, Greene 
was not confronted with the agents who had furnished the informa­
tion against him, nor was he given access to all of the specifics 
of the reports concerning his activities. 
The Supreme Court based its invalidation of the Department 
of Defense Industrial Security Program/ on the narrow ground of 
lack of authorization of the program/ by either Congress or the 
President. The majority opinion of the court reasoned that neither 
Congressional nor Presidential authorization could be inferred /ror 
a proce1_dure which did not provide the traditional safeguards / 
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usually thought ·of in the context of procedural "due process"--
to be precise, the right of a person to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him for cross-examination, and to have access 
to all specifics of the charges against him. The Supreme Court 
pointedly declined to express any view/ as to whether the procedures 
used in the case at hand/ would have been in violation of the 
Constitution /had they been authorized specifically by Congress 
and the President. Thus, while admitting the authority of the 
Department of Defense to establish an industrial security program..,..J 
by virtue of Executive Order No. 1~01 and inferred ~ngressional 
approval, the Court declined to infer from the same actions/an 
authorization to conduct the program in such a manner / as to deny 
the traditional and historical procedures of due process. 
I would be the last to criticize the Court / for declining to 
infer authorizations for executive departments and agencies. Such 
inferences could be extremely dangerous, and we are all most 
acutely aware/ that the departments and agencies are granted or 
assume the widest authorizations1 as it is. 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the decision is wrong. The 
Court has failed to distinguish between/what is a matter of right 
with the individual, and what is, at the greatest, a matter of 
privile#ge. This case did not deal with the right of an individual 
to hold a job /4r to preserve any right guaranteed to him by the 
Constitution. It involved solely the question /o r whether an 
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individual should have access to properly classified information/ 
presumably in the exclusive control of the Government. Under 
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such circumstances, the Government ha~ the right to determine 
who, and under what conditions persons shall receive classified 
information. The loss of employment which occured in this 
instance, and undoubtedly in others, was incidental to the 
decision of the Department of Defense/to deny such information 
to Greene. Since no right of the individual was involved, the 
procedure utilized by the Department of Defense/in arriving at 
the decision/ is and was immaterial. Justice Clark wisely noted 
this distinction / in his dissenting opinion. 
Regardless of whether we agree or disagree, individually, 
with the rationale of the Supreme Court's opinion, the fact 
remains / that the country is now without any effective industrial 
security program. The existing procedure could be made effective/ 
only through compromise of our entire security program/oy the 
process of nburning informant& and agents." The burden rests 
squarely on the Congress to remedy the situation. 
For the reasons stated, Mr. President, I send to the desk 
a bill to authorize and establish a Federal Industrial Security 
Programe In drafting this measure, I have relied heavily on 
the recommendations of the Commission on Government Security, 
published in June 1957. The bill I propose would establish 
specific criteria/for granting or denying clearances. It would 
deal with the questions of confrontation and cross-examination 
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forthrightly. While granting the maximum degree of safeguards for 
the individual, this proposal would also protect the identity of 
agents in the security program, and thereby, the security program 
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itself. 
I fervently hope that the committees and the Congress will 
expedite action in this field/4o that Congress may meet its 
responsibility in full/on thi_s vital question prior to adjournment. 
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